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Abstract 
There has been an increasing use of direct democracy in the form of referendums on 
aspects of European integration. Two such referendums have been held in Ireland in 2008 
and 2009 with the outcome changing from a No to a Yes vote. This paper addresses the 
question of what explains the change in outcome in two referendums on essentially the 
same document. It will do so by looking at the role of the campaign in providing information 
and hence reducing uncertainty, the importance of issue frames and the impact of domestic 
considerations on vote choice. It is suggested that there has not been a change in underlying 
attitudes but a change in how the Irish electorate weighed the same factors differently at 
both referendums. In addition, a change in economic conditions at the time of the second 
referendum also had an effect on how voters decided the second time around. 
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I.  Introduction 
When considering the dynamics of European integration in recent years, it becomes evident 
that there has been an increase in the use of direct democracy in the form of referendums to 
decide on crucial aspects of European integration, such as treaty changes or their actual 
ratification (Lisbon Treaty), accessions to the European Union (2004 Eastern Enlargement) 
or the adoption of the common currency (Denmark in 2000). In the course of the past four 
decades, a total of 45 referendums decided on aspects of European integration. The most 
recent referendum on European integration has been held in Ireland in 2009 after having 
failed to secure a Yes vote the first time in 2008. Considering that both France and the 
Netherlands had an unpleasant experience with the ratification of its predecessor, The 
Constitutional Treaty, which had been rejected in referendums in 2005, they now chose to let 
parliament make the decision on whether to adopt the Lisbon Treaty or not, leaving Ireland 
the only country to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon by popular vote. Having failed to secure a Yes 
vote at the first referendum in 2008, a second vote was held the year after and a Yes vote 
was reached. Taking this change in outcome as a starting point, one might wonder what has 
led to this scenario. Essentially, we are presented with two referendums on more or less the 
same document but with two very different outcomes. The central question to be addressed 
in this paper thus is what explains the change from a No to a Yes vote at Lisbon II? Several 
options will be explored. For instance, what role did the pro- and anti-treaty campaigns play 
in providing information and reducing uncertainty among the electorate? Were voters more 
informed the second time around and hence their voting behaviour had become less 
volatile? To what extent have attitudes changed on issues such as European integration, 
government performance and Irish neutrality? And finally, was it decisive that the second 
referendum was fought under a different economic climate? 
The article will be structured as follows. Section 2 will discuss the literature on voting 
behaviour in referendums and its applicability to the two Lisbon Treaty referendums. Section 
3 will briefly describe the economic and political circumstances at the time of both 
referendums and explore the two election campaigns in terms of their organisation and 
participation of various groups. Section 4 will discuss theoretical expectations before 
proceeding to Section 5, which presents data used for the subsequent analysis. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the results. 
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II.  Literature review on voting behaviour in referendums 
Interest in referendums is growing and has produced its own literature as part of the wider 
study of voting behaviour. Although much of the research on voting behaviour in general 
elections can easily be applied to the study of vote choice in referendums, a distinct field of 
research has developed that specifically addresses the peculiarities of referendums that 
distinguish them from other elections. 
A theory well advanced in the literature on vote choice in referendums is that of issue- and 
second-order voting. The former approach focuses on individuals’ values and beliefs with 
regard to the speed and direction of European integration. Put differently, voters base their 
decision on whether to endorse or reject EU treaties on their underlying attitudes towards 
European integration (Siune et al., 1994; Svensson, 2002). For this to happen, domestic 
considerations need to be de-coupled from the subject of the referendum itself. This 
approach allows voters to make reasoned calculations in line with their attitudes on 
European integration when deciding how to choose in a referendum. The second-order 
theory on the other hand is associated with the idea that referendums are sometimes 
considered as second-order elections where domestic considerations are a powerful 
determinant of vote choice (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Franklin et al., 1994; Franklin, 2002). 
National issues tend to dominate the campaign and voters use their vote as means of 
signalling support or dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent government. The 
referendum itself is perceived as less salient and consequently voters are more likely to 
decide on the basis of domestic considerations rather than on the subject matter of the 
referendum. While the second-order approach enables voters to express their domestic 
preferences, the issue-voting theory maintains that voters make rational calculations on the 
basis of their attitudes on EU-related matters. Much debate has revolved about which of 
these approaches provides a more accurate account of voting behaviour in referendums. 
Although they might not necessarily be mutually exclusive, it is more interesting to explore 
why and under what conditions people rely more on their attitudes towards the EU rather 
than on second-order, that is domestic, considerations. Moreover, the issue-voting approach 
leaves open the question of what exactly are the issues and how the pro- and anti-
referendum groups have framed them in the course of the campaign. Therefore, we need to 
identify and explore further the issues on which voters based their vote choice in the Lisbon 
Treaty referendums and think about the conditions that maximise second-order and issue 
considerations rather than simply look at which one of the two theories applies. In other 
words, it would be more interesting to discuss the issues that arose in the course of the 
campaign and how they have been framed by the Yes and No sides. Moreover, it is worth 
exploring to what extent domestic considerations such as government performance factored 
into the decision-making process of the Irish electorate. If the issue-approach were more 
applicable, then we would expect Irish voters to rely on their underlying attitudes towards 
Europe when deciding how to vote. This is rather unlikely considering that second-order 
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considerations such as satisfaction with the government under the then Taoiseach Bertie 
Ahern may have hindered a vote on Treaty-related issues.    
A second strand of literature considers the role and impact of referendum campaigns in 
providing information required to reduce uncertainty and confusion among the electorate. For 
instance, de Vreese (2007) found that the electorate in referendums tends to be more 
volatile given the complexity of the subject and high demands on the voter, making 
referendum campaigns even more vital in shaping voter preferences. Moreover, de Vreese 
and Semetko (2004) analyse the dynamics of referendum campaigns and highlight the 
importance of their agenda-setting and framing effects as well as the role of issue frames. 
Although referendum campaigns are similar to those at general elections in their role of 
providing information, they are even more crucial in that voting is often on complex and 
rather technical issues such as constitutional amendments. Although this is to some extent 
ameliorated by the fact that voters are faced with a simple either/or choice, voters are still 
dependent on factual knowledge and information to make a reasoned decision on Election 
Day1. Scholars within this field have looked at the role of heuristics such as elite behaviour 
and simple campaign cues that help voters make reasoned choices in referendums (Lupia, 
1992, 1994; Bowler and Donovan, 1998; Lupia and Johnston, 2001). One of the most easily 
accessible shortcuts in referendums is that of elite endorsements when not only parties take 
sides in campaigns but business and civil society groups may also be regarded as vital cue 
givers. They all become active in the campaign with the primary goal of setting the agenda 
as early as possible and providing vital information on said agenda (Holbrook, 1996; Farrell 
and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Hug and Tsebelis, 2002). Additional shortcuts include party ID, 
economic perceptions and government performance (Hobolt, 2005, 2006). If voters are 
satisfied with the way the government operates at the time of the election, they might be 
more inclined to follow the government’s recommendation on how to vote. If, however, they 
are dissatisfied with the way government works, they might use their vote to signal 
disapproval. Essentially, voters are highly dependent on these shortcuts to be able to make 
up their mind in the election.  
Information is vital to overcome the high levels of uncertainty and confusion that often 
characterises the electorate in a referendum. It is important to note here that not only the 
amount and selection but also the presentation of information critically shapes people’s 
perceptions of the treaty document, and more importantly about its implications upon being 
ratified. Hobolt (2009) rightly argues that if focus is placed on the negative consequences of 
a No vote, people tend to favour a proposal whereas if negative consequences of a Yes vote 
are highlighted, people are more likely to oppose the ballot. The former approach is usually 
pursued by the Yes side of a referendum campaign which became evident in particular at 
                                                     
1 In general, voters are presented with a simple binary choice as can be seen in the wording of the Lisbon Treaty 
referendum bill in 2009: “Do you approve of the proposal to amend the Constitution contained in the 
undermentioned Bill? Twenty-Eighth Amendment of the Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) Bill 2009” Voters were asked 
to place a mark in either the Yes or the No box. 
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Lisbon II, when a unified Yes side strongly emphasised adverse economic consequences of 
a second No vote. No campaigners are more likely to adopt the second strategy of drawing 
attention to negative consequences of a Yes vote which can be seen at Lisbon I when an 
alleged loss of the Irish Commissioner, a threat to Ireland’s low corporate tax rates and a 
reduction in minimum wages became the centre of attention. 
However, we are still left with the question of what determines which issues become 
important so that actors involved in the campaign know on what to focus and to provide 
information. A more recent strand discusses the role of issue frames in referendum 
campaigns (de Vreese and Semetko, 2004; Hobolt 2009). This literature is concerned with 
how certain aspects of a proposal are emphasised in a campaign while others are 
downplayed or even ignored (that is, they are kept off the agenda). The central idea is that 
the same proposal can be framed in different ways (Hobolt, 2009). Important for the analysis 
of Lisbon I and II is the consequence frame which posits that positive and negative 
consequences of the two possible outcomes are highlighted by both campaign sides. In 
other words, people’s perception of the Treaty was influenced by the way in which the 
proposal and the reversion point, that is the policy entailed by a No vote, had been framed 
by the two opposing sides. Public opinion is not only swayed by information provided by 
such frames but also provides firm opinions on the proposal that are in line with pre-existing 
attitudes on European integration. In this vein, the status quo bias theory maintains that 
voters attach more weight to the possible costs rather than the possible benefits of a change 
(Clarke et al., 2000; Beach and Nielsen, 2007). Applying this to the two Lisbon referendums, 
it might be argued that voters were more susceptible to the No side at Lisbon I considering 
that they strongly emphasised the costs involved if the Treaty was endorsed while being 
weakly disposed to the benefits highlighted by the Yes side. Put differently, costs involved in 
ratifying the Treaty (for example, transfer further economic decision-making powers to the 
EU) were deemed higher than the benefits derived from passing the Treaty (for example, 
facilitate decision-making in the EU and changing voting procedures in the Council of 
Ministers). The campaign at Lisbon I for the most part revolved around various bad 
consequences of a Yes vote and the No campaign took advantage of the fact that the 
electorate was uninformed about the Treaty and its implications (Qvortrup, 2009). The Yes 
side made the mistake of letting the No side frame the issues and set the agenda while the 
No campaign took advantage of the fact that voters were confused about a document that 
not even the then Taoiseach Brian Cowen had read “from cover-to-cover” (Horan, 2008). 
The Irish electorate was asked to vote on essentially the same Treaty on two occasions, but 
the first time, it was rejected by 53% while the second time, it was accepted by 67%2. But 
                                                     
2 Of course Ireland also held two referendums on the Nice treaty and which the outcome changed on the second 
vote. However, there are significant differences. Turnout at Nice 1 increased by almost 15% with the Yes side almost 
doubling and the No side remaining roughly the same, which suggests that abstainers mainly joined the Yes side 
rather than No voters changing their mind. Turnout at Lisbon 2, however, only increased by 5%, and the Yes vote 
increased from 46% to 67% and No voters dropped from 53% to 32%, which would imply a ‘conversion’ of No voters 
rather than abstainers joining the Yes camp. With turnout remaining almost the same but a fundamental change in 
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what exactly accounts for these different outcomes? Two scenarios are possible. First, public 
opinion changed on the factors that in 2008 were favourable to a different outcome. Second, 
the distribution of public opinion did not change, but voters weighed issues differently at both 
referendums. In order to decide which one applies, we need to explore to what extent the 
two campaigns differed at Lisbon I and II. In addition, we need to analyse the role of 
information, which will help us answer the question of whether people were more informed at 
Lisbon II and if so, did it have an impact on the final outcome? Bearing in mind the role of 
domestic considerations, did government performance play into account, given the financial 
allegations concerning the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern? And finally, was the vote essentially 
determined by the same factors, that is by the same issue frames, or did voters weighed 
them differently at Lisbon I and II? The main argument to be analysed in the data section 
below will be that voters did not change their underlying attitudes towards European 
integration but weighed the same factors differently at each referendum. In fact, it was 
changes in the context, campaign style and economic circumstances that contributed much 
more to the change in outcome. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
the distribution of Yes and No voters, it is all the more interesting to explore what accounts for the different outcome 
at the second Lisbon referendum. 
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III.  Site for study: political background and electoral 
context of Lisbon I and II 
Irish level of support for the EU, as measured by Eurobarometer surveys, has remained high 
over the past twenty years, which made a negative result of the first referendum quite 
unexpected. Politicians erroneously assumed the referendum would be carried comfortably, 
given that 82% of Irish people believed that Ireland had benefited from EU membership, 
compared to an EU average 54%, and 73% of respondents agreed that ‘membership is a 
good thing’ (Eurobarometer 69.2, 2008). An imminent change in Government delayed an 
official announcement of the election date, as the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern (Fianna Fáil) 
was deeply involved in financial allegations, which eventually resulted in his resignation in 
April 2008. He was succeeded by the former Finance Minister Brian Cowen, who officially 
announced the referendum on April 25. The date was set to be Thursday, June 12. By then, 
the anti-referendum side was already in full swing and well prepared to fight an organised 
campaign against the ratification of the Treaty.  
Given the decline of political parties as institutions, a rapid growth in electronic media 
technologies and the significance of opinion polls, campaigns are now regarded as 
mobilisers, main sources of information and key providers of valuable cues and short cuts. 
They are responsible for (re)presenting the framing of election issues in response to how 
campaigners on each side of the debate present their arguments (de Vreese and Semetko, 
2004). Farrell and Schmitt-Beck (2002) argue that campaign effects are contingent on its 
nature and the individual voter, finding that campaigns do matter but not necessarily for all 
voters all the time regardless of circumstances. Moreover, Zaller (1992) suggests that voters 
often enter campaigns with weak predispositions and low information levels, which is 
particularly the case in elections where new or previously unfamiliar issues enter the political 
arena. Therefore, a timely start to a campaign, setting the agenda and framing the issues are 
key ingredients to a successful campaign. At Lisbon I, these features primarily applied to the 
No campaign. The prominent No group Libertas effectively launched its campaign in 
December 2007 immediately after the Treaty had been signed. Not only did its campaigning 
start much earlier, but it was also more coherent, organised and well structured. In addition, 
the No side benefited from the generous financial support and widespread news coverage of 
Libertas leader Declan Ganley who was said to have spent more than one million Euros on 
its campaign and thus far outspent the Yes side (Collins and Hennessy, 2008). The agenda 
as defined by the No side was about the EU’s democratic deficit, threats to Ireland’s low 
corporate tax rate and workers’ rights, as well as the general diminution of Ireland’s influence 
within a European Union after the ratification of the Treaty, making it almost impossible for 
the Yes side to catch up in time or to reframe the issues in line with their arguments to 
support the Treaty. The Yes side was also divided, notably between government and 
opposition. Most parties campaigned in favour of the Treaty, but the Green Party failed to 
reach a two-third majority necessary to endorse the Treaty. In addition, campaign posters 
I H S — Marsh & Schwirz / Déjà-vu (again): The Lisbon Treaty Referendum in Ireland— 13 
tended to feature faces instead of facts while the No side employed provocative and clear 
messages to attract undecided and poorly informed voters. As a consequence, the Yes side 
faced a double challenge: first, they had to address these issues and clarify misconceptions 
accordingly, and second they were required to educate voters by presenting their arguments 
to vote in favour of Lisbon3.  
Given this somewhat one sided and relatively low-intensity campaign, it is not surprising that 
voters felt they lacked a substantial understanding of the Treaty on polling day. Low 
information levels combined with uncertainty reduced the chances of issue voting with low 
issue salience and voting on domestic considerations as a result. Sinnott et al. (2009) found 
a strong relation between information levels and vote choice, with those feeling they had 
insufficient information being more likely to abstain or vote No in 2008. A lack of information 
increased voter uncertainty, not only in terms of treaty knowledge, but also with regard to 
other domestic issues that were erroneously perceived to be included in the Treaty.  
The Referendum Commission found that in April 2008 only 20% stated they understood what 
the Lisbon Treaty was about “to some extent”, “quite well” or “very well” compared to 44% in 
June (Referendum Commission Report, 2008) Polls conducted for the Irish Times by TNS-
MRBI showed similar results, with only marginal increases between May and June in terms 
of “good understanding” (6% and 8% respectively). One third of voters were “vaguely aware” 
of the issues involved (31% in May and 33% in June) and 23% “understood some of the 
issues” in May as compared to 32% in June. Figure 1 indicates how information levels 
gradually changed over the course of the campaign. 
Responding to the failure to secure a Yes vote at the first referendum, the government 
identified key problems that had made a vote in favour of the treaty impossible. Among them 
were misconceptions about the issues raised by the referendum, implications for Ireland’s 
role in the EU and complaints about lack of information and poor knowledge of the treaty 
document. Not only did the guarantees secured at an EU summit in June 2009 offer a legal 
justification for holding a second referendum, but more importantly provided the Yes side 
with good reason to endorse the Treaty, emphasising that it had listened to the concerns of 
the electorate to which the guarantees were tailored4. This was also intended to take a range 
of reasons for voting No and abstention off the agenda and critically weaken the arguments 
                                                     
3 Slogans that featured on Yes campaign posters: ‘Good for Ireland, Good for Europe. Vote Yes.’ (Fianna Fáil), 
‘Vote Yes for jobs, the economy and Ireland’s future’ (IBEC).  
Slogans that featured on No campaign posters: ‘Yes to Europe, NO to Superstate’ (Peace and Neutrality Alliance), 
‘A Europe for people, not profit and war’ (People before Profit Alliance), ‘€ 1.84: Minimum wage after Lisbon?’ and 
‘Milked Dry’ (Coir). 
4 Technically, the document itself did not undergo any changes but it was agreed that Irish competency over tax 
rates, abortion and neutrality would be retained and each member state would continue to nominate a 
Commissioner. This resulted in the second referendum being held in a different legal and political context 
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used by the No side at Lisbon I. All major political parties5 presented a unified picture to the 
electorate, calling jointly for a Yes vote in early September to avoid previous campaign 
mistakes, focusing on the guarantees and how to respond to a rapid decline in the Irish 
economy. This time, the Yes side outspent the No campaign, considering the withdrawal of 
Libertas leader Declan Ganley that left the treaty’s opponents in a weaker financial position 
compared to Lisbon I. The second campaign mainly revolved around the Treaty being the 
solution to a rapid recovery from a poor economic climate in which the country found itself at 
the time of the second referendum. In addition, the Yes side was better organised and 
enjoyed strong support from civil society groups. Arguably, as a result, the electorate was 
more informed about the issues at stake and thus more likely to base its decision on them. 
Considering that the same issues were emphasised differently, that is by different campaign 
sides to varying degrees, did voters really change their underlying attitudes towards these 
issues or did the issues weigh differently in their decision-making process? 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 The Green Party reached the required two-third majority and for the first time officially endorsed a European treaty. 
On July 18, 2009, members of the Green Party voted on the question whether to endorse the treaty or not. Of those 
present, 214 voted Yes while 107 voted No, thus securing the two-third majority. 
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IV.  Theoretical expectations 
Given a more active campaign at Lisbon II and a reasonably greater role played by the Yes 
side within that campaign, what attitudes should we expect voters to have about the issues 
raised in the course of the campaign? One might argue that issues were emphasised 
differently by both sides of the referendum campaigns and therefore weighed differently in 
the decision-making process of the electorate. Put differently, we do not expect to find a 
change in underlying attitudes towards European integration but more so a change in the 
distribution of variables that were favourable to a Yes vote.  
A second set of considerations is related to the greater level of activity in the campaign. 
Considering that lack of information was the key reason to vote No at Lisbon I, a more 
vigorous campaign in 2009 is expected to produce a well-informed electorate, which would 
make voting less idiosyncratic and voting behaviour more predictable. If voters were in fact 
more informed the second time around, we would expect bad consequences as emphasised 
by the No side at Lisbon I to feature less prominently in voters’ decision-making. Moreover, a 
change in economic conditions should also be taken into account, considering that Lisbon II 
was held at the onset of the economic and financial crisis in Ireland.  
Essentially, it will be argued that there were no substantial changes in public opinion about 
issues such as the EU or neutrality but a change in the relationship between the views on 
these issues and vote choice. The different outcome at Lisbon II is expected to be 
attributable to the way in which these issues related to vote choice rather than to underlying 
variables. Therefore, we need to analyse to what extent the distribution of opinion shifted 
between 2008 and 2009 on issues such as government approval, EU support, neutrality and 
potential treaty consequences. Put differently, are the two votes determined by the same 
factors or did the factors stay the same but were weighed differently? 
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V.  The data 
Data comes from two surveys conducted by RED C immediately after each referendum. 
RED C interviewed a random sample of 1,002 adults over the age of 18 and interviews were 
conducted across the country by telephone, using a mix of land and mobile lines. There were 
questions about general issues and about perceptions of the Treaty. For instance, 
respondents were asked about their knowledge of the EU in general, and the Treaty in 
particular, and about its implications, which featured prominently during the campaign. 
Respondents were provided with a number of claims that were made about what the Treaty 
would mean for Ireland. For instance, would the Treaty have “compromised Ireland’s 
neutrality” or “led to a change in tax on businesses”. In addition, questions were asked about 
past and future voting behaviour and evaluations of the current government.  
The key variables for the analysis below are as follows: 
• Vote choice: in the 2007 parliamentary elections; in a hypothetical general election ‘if 
it were to be held tomorrow’, and in the referendum. 
• Attitudes to major issues: neutrality, immigration, abortion and taxation. 
• Attitudes to actors and institutions: trust in party leaders and support for the EU as 
well as a question about political identity.6  
• Expectations about the consequences of a Yes vote: on Ireland’s neutrality, the 
practice of abortion, tax on businesses, Ireland’s influence on EU decisions, 
protection of workers’ rights, unemployment, Ireland’s European Commissioner and 
decision-making in the EU. 
• Economic conditions and expectations: past and future benefits of EU membership 
and retrospective personal economic evaluations. 
• Demographics. 
It appeared that responses to some questionnaire items derive from common, underlying 
orientations. This allowed us to construct two composite measures: a party leader trust scale 
and a negative treaty consequences scale. The first is comprised of four items on trust in 
‘your’ party leader to do the right thing on the economy, health, Europe and moral issues; 
these items formed a very strong unidimensional cumulative scale. The second consists of 
five items tapping people’s expectation that the Treaty would have ‘bad’ consequences – at 
least the No campaign saw these as bad – in terms of neutrality, abortion, corporation taxes, 
unemployment, and Irish influence on EU decision-making.7 The finding that a set of items is 
                                                     
6 The support for integration variable originally contained missing values for 18% of cases because it was 
erroneously not asked of all respondents.  We imputed missing values (using AMELIA, see King et al 2001) where 
data was missing. 
7 The unidimensionality of these two sets of items was assessed using Mokken’s procedure for stochastic 
cumulative scaling (Mokken, 1971; Niemöller and Van Schuur 1983; Van Schuur 2003). The strength of a Mokken 
scale is measured by the coefficient of homogeneity (H), which should exceed .30. The bad consequences Mokken 
scale has an H-coefficient of .47, and the trust scale of .68. For the purposes of these analyses each item was 
recoded into a dichotomy trust/ not trust and bad/not bad. 
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unidimensional is not only of importance in a measurement sense (allowing a composite 
measure to be used in lieu of a set of separate items), but also in terms of the substantive 
interpretation of what the constituent items reflect. The very diversity of the nature of the 
consequences, and the absence of any substantive linkage between them, suggests that the 
responses to these items are not rooted in specific ideas or expectations about how the 
Treaty would affect policy in each of these issue domains. Rather, they reflect the degree to 
which people hold a diffuse and generalized expectation that the Treaty will bring negative 
consequences. This will express itself in whatever policy domain is probed in terms of 
potential negative consequences. In other words, if asked whether consequences in other 
policy areas would be negative, people’s responses would equally have reflected this 
generalized and diffuse feeling of apprehension.8 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 This interpretation begs the question why three of the items of this battery of items about consequences could not 
be included in this unidimensional bad consequences scale. The item that the treaty would ‘lead us to losing our EU 
Commissioner for some of the time’ probably does not fit because it is almost universally subscribed to, irrespective 
of one’s opinion about the merits of the treaty. The other two items that were not part of the scale were that the 
treaty would ‘have strengthened the protection of workers’ rights’ and ‘have simplified decision-making in the EU’. 
The difference between these and the scaled items could be simply that these items are cast in positive evaluative 
terminology, whereas the scale items are formulated in negative terms. 
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VI.  Analysis 
This analysis has three parts. First, we will look at the 2008 vote to establish the 
determinants of the No vote on that occasion, examining the effects of the variables outlined 
in the previous section. It will be shown that the No vote is associated with most of the 
possible determinants identified above, such as partisanship –support for different parties 
and attitude towards the government – and the interpretation of the Treaty, as well as more 
general political issues orientations, such as those on the EU in general and neutrality.  Next 
we will look at how far the distribution of opinion shifted between 2008 and 2009 on these 
determinants. For instance, did voters become more or less supportive of the EU, or more or 
less supportive of the government parties? Clearly, if they did, that could explain the change 
in outcome between the two votes. If there is No change then we have to look elsewhere for 
an explanation. Finally, we will show the extent to which the two votes were determined by 
the same factors, and the extent to which the weight of each factor was very different.  
Table 1 shows the marginal effects of partisan cues, treaty interpretations and general issues 
on the No vote. Significant factors are in bold. (For the logit estimations underlying these, 
see Appendix.) The Table shows that all three of these sets of factors contributed to the 
outcome. Government voters tended to vote Yes though not in significant numbers, and 
those supporting the Yes inclined opposition parties were also not significantly more likely to 
vote Yes; the significant partisan, ‘second order’ effect was a clear association between 
disapproval of the government’s performance and a No vote. Some general issue 
orientations were significant drivers of an anti-Treaty choice, notably views on European 
integration and attitudes to Irish neutrality. Finally, features of the Treaty, and the debate 
about its possible consequences were linked significantly to vote choice. A general 
perception that the Treaty, if approved, would damage Irish neutrality, increase 
unemployment, bring abortion closer, diminish Irish influence in the EU and threaten 
Ireland’s low tax on international business led to a No vote, whereas a view that the Treaty 
would strengthen workers’ rights and simplify decision making gave rise to a Yes vote.  
The perceived strength of what we have called the ‘bad’ consequences factor was 
addressed by the government in its dealings with the EU and lay behind the declaration by 
EU officials that the Treaty offered no threat to Irish neutrality, or to its (non) abortion regime 
and so on. However, after the No vote and before the possible second vote the government 
had to confront a banking crisis. Their response to this almost certainly led directly to its 
heavy electoral defeat in early 2011, as from that point the government’s own support level 
fell dramatically in terms of both popular satisfaction with the government and voting 
intentions for government parties.  
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Table 2 shows the impact of some of these events on the distribution of opinion on the 
factors displayed in Figure 2. The most obvious changes were in terms of ‘bad’ 
consequences and disapproval of the government. The former moved the voters sharply in 
the direction of a Yes vote, whereas the latter moved opinion sharply towards a No vote. In 
general, however, there was little change in any of the factors that proved significant in the 
2008 analysis (marked by bold letters again). In particular, there was no change in general 
orientations to the EU, or in trust of the political parties supported.  On this basis it would 
appear that the expected outcome should not have been very different, although given the 
fact that the impact of the ‘bad’ consequences was greater than government dissatisfaction, 
we might expect a small boost to the Yes vote. In fact, if the estimates from the model run for 
2008 are applied to the data for 2009, we can see that this is so. The predicted outcome 
from this exercise was a 4-percentage point shift away from the No side and towards the Yes 
side. This is very small, given that the actual shift was 22 points.  
This implies that the statistical explanation for the different outcome in 2009 lies less in the 
underlying variables and more in the way in which those variables related to vote choice. In 
other words, there was a change in the marginal effects of some, or even most variables in 
the model. We can see this in Table 3 (for the estimations underlying this table, see 
Appendix) that shows the marginal effects on a No vote of each variable in 2009 and 2008.  
Some of the partisanship variables had similar effects in 2009 to that which they had in 2008.  
This is true of government voting, and of Yes-opposition voting, although the Yes opposition 
parties mobilised their support better in 2009. The most striking change in this respect was 
the very weak, and insignificant, impact of government disapproval, which had a very 
significant impact in 2008. In 2009 this contributed at best marginally towards the No vote. 
This is notable since a large majority of people in 2009 disapproved of the government. 
Treaty interpretations were also less important; fewer thought there were bad consequences 
from a Yes vote, and such negative perceptions in any event had a smaller marginal effect, 
less than half of the 15 per cent found in 2008.  
Other treaty features, such as simplifying decision-making and protecting workers’ rights also 
had much less impact, the perceived consequences being less related or even not related to 
vote choice. More general orientations on neutrality and European integration were also less 
important, and attitudes to neutrality were not significant at all. In general then attitudinal and 
treaty perception factors proved less important, and in many cases were not significant. Nor 
was government approval. The only factor that was more important was support for pro-
treaty parties. Partisanship, at least in this sense, became more important as a wealth of 
issue related factors seemed to be less important.   
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VII.  Discussion 
This result is a curious one. We would have expected the stronger campaign to have 
mobilised supporters of Fianna Fáil and the Greens, Fine Gael and Labour to support the 
Treaty, and a higher level of information to lessen the tendency of those who knew little other 
than that the Treaty was supported by a government of which they disapproved. We might 
have expected that a stronger Yes campaign would have changed the balance between Yes 
and No inclined attitudes, particularly with respect to perceptions of the consequences of a 
Yes vote, but we would not have expected such a campaign to leave such attitudes more 
weakly linked to vote choice. It is evident that people did know more about the treaty, but the 
implication seems to be that the Treaty simply did not matter as much! 
Figure 2 seems to confirm that information was much more closely related to voting No in 
2008 than it was in 2009. Unfortunately, the 2008 survey did not contain any measure of 
information, but the 2009 survey did include a four-item knowledge scale. This is not geared 
to the Treaty as such but to the EU. However, it is reasonable to assume that those who 
know more about the EU will know more about the Treaty. We can compare the association 
between knowledge (measured in 2009) with vote choice in 2009 and recalled vote choice in 
2008.  What we see in Figure 2 is that there is a strong link between recalled vote choice 
and knowledge, but a weaker relationship between knowledge and vote in 2009.  Analysis of 
the government commissioned surveys, carried out by Millward Brown in July 2008 and 
November 2009 suggest a similar pattern with knowledge of the EU and the Treaty itself 
correlated more closely with vote choice in 2008 than 2009, and the knowledge of the Treaty 
itself much less significant in the outcome.  
Why should that be so? A vital factor on the second occasion could well have been the sharp 
deterioration in the health of the Irish economy. Perhaps what we can now see as the 
unjustified confidence in the Irish state to make its own way in the world was replaced with a 
realisation that to get out of the mess in which the financial regime had left the country it 
would be necessary to seek help from Ireland’s EU partners. It is hard to know how far this 
rationale was critical to the change in the outcome. The real significance of Ireland’s 
economic woes took quite a long time to become evident, and perhaps only with the arrival 
of the team from the ECB and IMF was the situation exposed as critical for all to see, but the 
main fall in government support just, after the guarantees to the banks in Sept 2008. This 
was not long after the initial rejection of the Treaty. Polls were not taken regularly after this 
point, but an Irish Times/TNS MRBI poll in November 2008 suggested that the Yes side was 
now in the lead. The question asked here included the explicit assumption that EU leaders 
would provide the guarantees being asked for by the Irish government. This poll indicated a 
dramatic shift from a post referendum poll in late July that suggested opinion against the 
Treaty had hardened. The Yes lead was even stronger at almost 2:1 in a RED C survey in 
mid January 2009, and the question asked on this occasion contained no qualification.  
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There was relatively little change after this point. This is consistent with the argument that 
what had changed was the economic circumstances rather than a change, through 
guarantees, of the Treaty itself.  
Respondents to the two polls analysed here were asked about the benefits that could be 
expected from the EU in future. In 2008 the question was “what would you expect for the 
next few years, would you expect Ireland to benefit from being a member of the EU, or not?” 
The wording in 2009 was somewhat different, but it could be argued, still comparable: “The 
outcome of the referendum of 2 October was a ‘Yes’ to the Lisbon Treaty. Which of the 
following statements comes closest to your view?  ‘The referendum result will help an 
economic recovery in Ireland’ OR ‘the referendum result will be harmful to an economic 
recovery in Ireland’”. The 2008 wording was related to vote choice with those expecting 
benefits more likely to vote Yes. However, in 2009 the relationship was much, much stronger.  
A post-referendum Eurobarometer poll lends additional support to this. The top three 
reasons given by respondents who voted Yes were: EU has been/is good for Ireland (51%), 
The treaty is good for Ireland/ it was in the best interest of Ireland (44%) and It will help the 
economy (33%) (Irish Times ‘Economy played key role in treaty vote, poll finds’, Oct 13, 
2009). A similar picture emerged from a post referendum poll carried out for the Irish Times 
by TNS/MRBI (Voters vacillate between gratitude and fear on EU: Nov 11, 2009).  
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VIII.  Conclusions 
The unambiguous finding here is that the two outcomes owe more to the fact of different 
campaigns in a different context than any underlying change in attitudes or loyalties. It is 
certainly arguable that greater levels of information in 2009 did help the Yes vote, by 
weakening perceptions that the Treaty would have adverse consequences for many things 
that voters might value, and for providing voters with the confidence not to reject anything 
that an almost unprecedentedly unpopular government might suggest. It is tempting to think 
that the increase in the numbers of voters who felt they did have a good understanding of the 
Treaty did make a big difference, but the evidence is hardly clear on this point. Rather, the 
change in the outcome is more likely due to the very different circumstances in which the 
second referendum was fought. The significance of these results is most obviously that the 
results we find in any analysis are contingent, but also that the nature of the campaign is an 
important aspect of that contingency. However, they also suggest that the view that more 
intense campaigns serve to promote issue voting should also be qualified, and also raise 
some questions about the extent to which voters do really make the ‘right’ choice even why 
they have little information.  In essence the stronger campaign may have removed some of 
the justifications for voting No, but the most critical fact, and perhaps one stressed implicitly 
in the Yes campaign, was that this vote was less about the Treaty and more about sending a 
signal to the EU that we were good Europeans (and could look forward to help in the future.) 
Curiously perhaps, the No side promoted the first vote as a free vote, arguing that terms 
could be renegotiated. That the second time around was a real vote all sides agreed, but 
perhaps it was still a signalling vote. The first time the signal was try again, and anyway we 
don’t need you; next time it was Help! 
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IX.  Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Changing levels of understanding  
 
 
 
 
(source: Referendum Commission Report, 2009) 
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Figure 2: Marginal effects on No vote in 2008 (significant effects in capitals) 
 
 
 
 
Logit estimation using multivariate model which also included gender, age and occupation, 
as well as national/European identity 
 
Note: Bad consequences include those on neutrality, employment, abortion, influence in EU 
and business taxation 
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Figure 3: Shifts in balance of opinion on key factors 2008-2009 (significant effects in 
capitals) 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Bad consequences include those on neutrality, employment, abortion, influence in EU 
and business taxation 
 
 
No side__________Shift in opinion 2008 -2009___________Yes side 
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Figure 4: Marginal effects on No vote, 2008 and 2009   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Bad consequences include those on neutrality, employment, abortion, influence in EU 
and business taxation
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Table 1: Marginal effects on No vote in 2008 (significant effects in bold) 
 
 
 2008 
Government voter -0.14 
FG/Lab voter -0.04 
Disapprove of government 0.19 
Trust party -0.05 
  
Too many foreigners 0.03 
Pro abortion -0.02 
Pro neutrality 0.09 
  
Bad consequences 0.16 
Pro low corporation tax -0.12 
Lose commissioner 0.00 
Against more Integration 0.11 
Treaty protects W-rights -0.31 
Treaty simplifies -0.29 
 
 
 
Table 2: Shifts in balance of opinion on key factors 2008-2009 (positive sign indicates shift 
favouring Yes side) 
 
 2008 2009 Change 
Government voter (1/0) 0.41 0.25 -0.16 
FG/Lab voter (1/0) 0.32 0.45 +0.13 
Disapprove of government 
(1/4) 
2.80 3.38 -0.58 
Trust party (4/0) 2.57 2.66 +0.09 
    
Too many foreigners (3/1) 2.21 2.20 +0.01 
Pro abortion (3/1) 2.57 2.62 -0.05 
Pro neutrality (3/1) 2.62 2.56 +0.06 
    
Bad consequences (5/0) 2.30 1.73 +0.57 
Pro low corporation tax (3/1) 2.56 2.39 0.17 
Lose commissioner (1/0) 0.15 0.23 -0.08 
Against more Integration (3/1) 1.71 1.66 +0.05 
Treaty protects W-rights (1/0) 0.57 0.62 +0.05 
Treaty simplifies (1/0) 0.74 0.79 +0.05 
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Table 3: Marginal effects on No vote, 2008 and 2009 (positive sign indicates a shift favouring 
the Yes side) 
 
 
 2008 2009 Difference in 
size 
Government voter -0.14 -0.26 +0.11 
FG/Lab voter -0.04 -0.16 +0.12 
Disapprove of 
government 
0.19 0.10 +0.09 
Trust party -0.05 0.02 -0.07 
    
Too many foreigners 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 
Pro abortion -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 
Pro neutrality 0.09 0.06 +0.03 
    
Bad consequences 0.16 0.16 0.00 
Pro low corporation tax -0.12 0.00 -0.12 
Lose commissioner 0.00 0.03 -0.03 
Against more Integration 0.11 0.13 -0.02 
Treaty protects W-rights -0.31 -0.16 -0.15 
Treaty simplifies -0.29 -0.17 -0.12 
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